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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990856-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

DAVID L. HANSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed plain error, or caused Hansen to suffer

a manifest injustice, in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses to theft set
forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-402? To obtain appellate relief, Stanley must
show: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
(hi) the error is harmful. . . . " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
2.

Whether Hansen was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel?

"Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can
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only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do
so as a matter of law.. .If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but prejudice
cannot be determined on the record before us, remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder.
860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah
App. 1993). To establish ineffective counsel Stanley must show: ff(l) that his counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error."
Strickland V.Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
David L. Hansen appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Ray M. Harding after he was convicted by a jury of Theft of a Motor
Vehicle, a second degree felony.
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B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
David L. Hansen was charged by information filed in Fourth Circuit Court,

Provo Department, on August 12, 1994, with Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-404, 412 (R. 3).
On February 13, 1995, a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Steven L.
Hansen at which time Hansen was bound over to Fourth District Court for trial on the
charge upon a finding of probable cause (R. 19-20).
On July 5, 1995, a jury trial was held with Judge Ray M. Harding presiding and
Hansen was found by the jury to be "guilty" of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second
degree felony (R. 177, 178-180, 249).
On August 18, 1995, Hansen was sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State
Prison (R. 183-84, 250). After sentencing, Hansen sought to stay the time to file an
appeal pending resolution of the issue of restitution (R. 188). The trial court granted
his motion (R. 190). On October 18, 1995, a restitution hearing was held and Hansen
was ordered to pay $750 in restitution (R. 193, 251, 194-95, 202-03). After the
restitution issue was resolved, Hansen appealed (R. 198-99) (Case No. 950785-CA).
However, Hansen's appeal was dismissed because this Court found it lacked
jurisdiction (R. 215). Hansen subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief
(R. 220-29). The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Hansen on September
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1, 1999 (R. 239). A Notice of Appeal was filed in Fourth District Court on September
30, 1999, and this action commenced (R. 242).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Bethany Westwood
Bethany Westwood testified that Hansen contacted her by telephone in April of
1994 and asked if he could do some work at the house that Westwood's son, Kevin
Edwards, lives in for a couple of days and Westwood agreed (R. 249 at 44). At the
time Westwood and Edwards owned a 1971 GMC truck (R. 249 at 45). Westwood
testified that she gave the truck to Edwards, but that when he borrowed money to have
the truck fixed, he added her name to the car's title by notorized signature (R. 249 at
47-48, 51-53).
B. Testimony of Kevin Edwards
Kevin Edwards testified that he lived in Provo at 355 South 600 West in a house
owned by his mother (R. 249 at 54). In April of 1994, Edwards had a 1971 GMC
truck (R. 249 at 55). Edwards testified that he kept the truck title in the glove
compartment (R. 249 at 57). Although Edwards testified that he did not routinely keep
vehicle titles in the glove box (R. 249 at 64).
Edwards testified that on April 6, 1994, Hansen was staying at his house and
doing some work to earn money (R. 249 at 57). That evening, Hansen borrowed the
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truck to go to Salt Lake City (R. 249 at 58). Hansen took Edwards' dog with him
(Id.). Edwards testified that he told Hansen that he wanted Hansen to return in a few
hours (R. 249 at 58).
Edwards testified that he never knowingly transferred the title of the truck to
Hansen, that he never intended to sell Hansen the truck, and that Hansen never paid
him any money for the truck (R. 249 at 60). Hansen did not return with the truck or
the dog nor did he contact Edwards until after he was arrested by the police (R. 249 at
60).
Edwards admitting to consuming alcohol on April 6, 1994--"a few highballs"
(R. 249 at 62).
Two days after Hansen went to work at the house, Edwards called Westwood
and told her that Hansen had borrowed the truck and had not returned it (R. 249 at 46).
Westwood called the police (Id.).
C. Testimony of Charlie Peterson
Charlie Peterson testified that on April 6, 1994, he was going to an AA meeting
and stopped at Edwards' house in Provo (R. 249 at 69-70). Peterson asked Edwards if
he wanted to go and Edwards agreed (R. 249 at 70). Peterson testified that he
"gathered that Kevin and David were going to go to Salt Lake to the bar, and then
Kevin decided to go with me. And it sounded to me like Kevin~not Kevin, but David
was going to use the truck, and then he was going to be back later that evening" (R.
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249 at 70-71). Peterson testified that Edwards agreed that Hansen could take die dog
with him (R. 249 at 71). Peterson testified that Edwards had been drinking that
evening but that he did not appear to be intoxicated (R. 249 at 72).
D. Testimony of Tim Meyer
Tim Meyer, a Provo City police officer, testified that in April of 1994 he was
contacted by Edwards and Westwood about the theft of a 1971 GMC truck (R. 249 at
78). Meyer testified that he conducted an investigation and eventually found the truck
in the possession of a Jerry Dawson in Montana (R. 249 at 79).
E. Testimony of Jerry Dawson
Jerry Dawson testified mat he is a resident of Montana who met Hansen in July
of 1994 (R. 249 at 87-88). Dawson 's business is located in the same building as an
automotive center (R. 249 at 88). Dawson had been looking for a used engine when
Hansen came into the auto center and indicated that he had an engine for sale (R. 249 at
88). Dawson testified that Hansen told him that the motor was in a wrecked truck at a
wrecking yard and that he could look at it (Id.). Hansen also told Dawson that he had
rolled the truck in an accident (Id.). According to Dawson, the truck-except for the
engine-was demolished (R. 249 at 89). Dawson paid Hansen $425 for the engine,
which was in good shape (R. 249 at 89, 96). Dawson testified that he never asked
about ownership of the truck nor was he ever shown the vehicle's title (R. 249 at 91).
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Approximately 7-10 days later, Hansen testified thai he drove the truck to
Montana where he would be working for his brother (R. 249 at 102). Hansen testified
that he planned to register the vehicle in Montana, but he got in an accident in which
the truck was totaled and Hansen broke his back (R. 249 al 103).
Hansen testified that after he got out of the hospital, he sold the truck's engine to
Dawson (R. 249 at 103).
Hansen testified that he believed that he was the owner of the truck (R. 249 at
104). Hansen indicated that he "thought all I had to do was send it in to the newwhere I was going to get it registered, send the title in, get the title in the other state
and registration in that state" (R. 249 at 104).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hansen asserts that the trial court committed an obvious and harmful error in
failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses to theft set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-402(3). Furthermore, Hansen was deprived the effective assistance
of counsel because of trial counsel's failure to argue or assert an affirmative defense
under § 76-6-402(3).
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ARGUMENT
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!!'
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-402(3) sets forth 'the affirmative defenses to "the
offense of theft:
ie actor:
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(a)

Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or
service involved; or

(b)

Acted under an honest belief that he had the right to obtain
or exercie control over the property or service as he did; or

(c)

Obtained or exercised control over the property or service
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have
consented.

Hansen asserts that under the facts of this case, the jury should have been instructed on
these affirmative defenses-particularly subsection (a) and/or (b). Moreover, Hansen
asserts that under the facts of this case, it was obvious and harmful error for the trial
court not to so instruct the jury-error which caused Hansen to suffer a manifest
injustice.
According to Hansen's testimony, he bought the truck from Edwards for $650
approximately 7-10 days before leaving for Montana (R. 249 at 99-102). Even
Edwards acknowledged that Hansen had permission to take the truck (R. 249 at 58).
Moreover, according to Hansen, Edwards retrieved the title to the truck from the
bedroom (R. 249 at 101-02), which is more consistent wiith Westwood's testimony that
she believed that the title was in a bedroom than was Edwards' testimony that he kept
the title in the truck's glove box (R. 249 at 57).
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Hansen asserts that the jury should have been instructed that it was a defense to
the offense of theft if he "acted under an honest claim of right to the property" or if he
"acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the
property". The evidence presented at trial clearly established such a defense. The trial
court's failure to so instruct the jury was not only obvious error but it was also harmful
because it robbed Hansen of a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. See,
State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah App. 1998) and State v. Cude. 383 P.2d
399, 401 (Utah 1963) (If at the time of the taking of the property by the defendant, he
in.good faith believed said property was his, or if the jury had reasonable doubt to that
effect, then he should be acquitted).
Accordingly, Hansen requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand
the case back to the Fourth District for new proceedings because of the manifest
injustice which Hansen suffered because of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury
as to the affirmative defenses to theft.

POINT II
HANSEN WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised concurrently with
an allegation of plain error because if the error was plain to the court, it should also
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have been plain to trial counsel. See, Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1208-09, 1225-29 (Utah
1993); and State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 826 (Utah App. 1994).
As a result, this Court should conclude as a matter of law that, based upon the
obvious and harmful failure of trial counsel to request that the jury be instructed as to
the affirmative defenses to theft, Hansen was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
See State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993) ("Where the ineffective
assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can only determine that the
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as a matter of
law.").
In determining whether Hansen was denied the effective assistance of counsel
"this court cannot apply rigid mechanical rules, but instead must focus Non the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" Strickland
v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State v. Snyder. 860
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993).
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show:
(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,
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and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for
counsel's error." State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989).
To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Hansen must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness, but the court is not to
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson. 850 p.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993); Crestani.
707 P.2d at 1089. It should have been obvious to counsel-as well as the court-that the
evidence produced at trial created more than a reasonable likelihood of an affrimative
defense under § 76-6-402(3). Therefore, counsel should have requested that the jury be
instructed as to the defenses. Likewise, counsel had an obligation to present and argue
a defense to the charge. His failure to argue the statutory defenses set forth in the Utah
Code robbed Hansen of competent representation.
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability has been described as
"a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See Strickland.
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. "The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." Crestani. 771 P.2d at 1092. In this particular case the
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adversarial process cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Had counsel
done his homework with respect to the facts of the case and the available defenses
under § 76-6-402(3), then the jury would have been instructed as to the statutory
defenses to theft and Hansen would have had a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result.
Therefore, this Court should vacate Stanley fs convictions on grounds that
"counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Hansen asks that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the matter to
Fourth District Court because the trial court committed obvious and harmful error, and
trial counsel rendered deficient and prejudicial representation, in their failure to instruct
the jury as to the affirmative defenses to theft set forth in the Utah Code.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/^i day of April, 2000.

/hiwi/f 'Tii*
Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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CRIMINAL CODE

estate, tangible and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments
or other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or Otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as
telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any
scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him,
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring
about a transfer of possession or of some other legally
recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or
another; in relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make
any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
object:
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under such circumstances
that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of
the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) lb restore the property only upon payment of a
reward or other compensation; or
(c) Tb dispose of the property under circumstances
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized contror me^ns,
but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespas^ory
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an
impression of law or fact that is false and that the
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact
that the actor previously created or confirmed by
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment
of another and that the actor does not now believe to
be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, sjecurity interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is
or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction, which
performance the actor does not intend to perfonfl or
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that
failure to perform the prjomise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an
interest in the property or service stolen if another person
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of
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this subsection shall not include a security interest for t
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to t
property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the rip
to obtain or exercise control over the property
service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the proper
or service honestly believing that the owner
present, would have consented.
'Xi
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a sim
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heret
fore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailee
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receivu
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported 1
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified i
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the power <
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance c
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defenfc
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise, \ft
76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unautbc
rized control over the property of another with a purpose t
deprive him thereof.
\#
76-6-405. Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises contfo
over property of another by deception and with a purpose tc
deprive him thereof.
Q) Tneftby deception does not occur, Viowever, when foien
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance
or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary person*
in the group addressed. "Puffing'' means an exaggeratec
commendation of wares or worth in communications ad
dressed to the public or to a class or group.
tfW
76-6-406. Theft by extortion.
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercis*
control over the property of another by extortion and with •
purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person
threatens to:
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the person
threatened or to any other person or to property at any
time; or
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person
to physical confinement or restraint; or
**#
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; at
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed V
the person threatened; or
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold
mony or information with respect to another's legal claJBV
or defense; or
ym
(g) Take action as an official agaiix&t anyone or aflt
thing, or withhold official action, or cause such action °6
withholding; or
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or oil
similar collective action to obtain property which is 1 ^
demanded or received for the benefit of the group w ^ ^
the actor purports to represent; or
38|
(i) Do any other act which would not in itself subst^
tially benefit him but which would harm substantialv|
any other person with respect to that person's neaJ*J|L
safety, business, calling, career,financialcondition, re$£|
l
tation, or personal relationships.
^
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(4) "Telecommunication device" means:
(a) any type of instrument, device, machine, or
equipment which is capable of transmitting or receiving telephonic, electronic, or radio communications;
or
(b) any part of an instrument, device, machine, or
equipment, or other computer circuit, computer chip,
electronic mechanism, or other component, which is
capable of facilitating the transmission or reception
of telephonic or electronic communications within the
radio spectrum allocated to cellular radio telephony.
(5) "Telecommunication service" includes any service
provided for a charge or compensation to facilitate the
origination, transmission, emission, or reception of signs,
signals, writings, images, and sounds or intelligence of
any nature by telephone, including cellular telephones,
wire, radio, television optical or other electromagnetic
system.
(6) "Telecommunication service provider" means any
person or entity providing telecommunication service including a cellular telephone or paging company or other
person or entity which, for a fee, supplies the facility, cell
site, mobile telephone switching office, or other equipment
or telecommunication service.
(7) "Unlawful telecommunication device" means any
telecommunication device that is capable of, or has been
altered, modified, programmed, or reprogrammed, alone
or in conjunction with another access device, so as to be
capable of, acquiring or facilitating the acquisition of a
telecommunication service without the consent of the
telecommunication service provider. Unlawful devices include tumbler phones, counterfeit phones, tumbler microchips, counterfeit microchips, and other instruments capable of disguising their identity or location or of gaining
access to a communications system operated by a telecommunication service provider.
1994
76-6-409.6. U s e of t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n d e v i c e t o a v o i d
l a w f u l c h a r g e for s e r v i c e — Penalty.

(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with
the intent to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for
telecommunication service or with the knowledge that it was
to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommunication service is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service is less than $300 or cannot be ascertained;
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service charge is or exceeds $300 but is not
more than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than
$5,000; or
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is or exceeds $5,000.
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an
offense under this section shall be guilty of a second degree
felony upon a second conviction and any subsequent conviction.
1995
76-6-409.7. Possession of any unlawful telecommunication device — Penalty.
%(1) Any person who knowingly possesses an unlawful telecommunication device shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) If any person knowingly possesses five or more unlawful
telecommunication devices in the same criminal episode, he
•tall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1994
76-6-409.8. Sale of an unlawful telecommunication device — Penalty.
, •ft)Any person shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor who
^tentionally sells an unlawful telecommunication device or
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material, including hardware, data, computer software, or
other information or equipment, knowing that the purchaser
or a third person intends to use such material in the manufacture of an unlawful telecommunication device.
(2) If the offense under this section involves the intentional
sale of five or more unlawful telecommunication devices
within a six-month period, the person committing the offense
shall be guilty of a third degree felony.
1994
76-6-409.9. Manufacture of a n unlawful telecommunication device — Penalty.
(1) Any person who intentionally manufactures an unlawful telecommunication device shall be guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(2) If the offense under this section involves the intentional
manufacture of five or more unlawful telecommunication
devices within a six-month period, the person committing the
offense shall be guilty of a third degree felony.
1994
76-6-409.10. P a y m e n t of r e s t i t u t i o n — Civil action —Other remedies retained.
(1) A person who violates Sections 76-6-409.5 through 766-409.9 shall make restitution to the telecommunication service provider for the value of the telecommunication service
consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this
section. Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and
costs for investigation, service calls, employee time, and
equipment use.
(2) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect
the right of a telecommunication service provider to bring a
civil action for red cess for damages suffered as a result of the
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section.
(3) This section does not abridge or alter any other right,
action, or remedy otherwise available to a telecommunication
service provider.
1996
76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of property
pursuant to repair or rental agreement.
A person is guilty of theft if:
(1) Having custody of property pursuant to an agreement between himself or another and the owner thereof
whereby the actor or another is to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair, or use of such property, he intentionally
uses or operates it, without the consent of the owner, for
his own purposes in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or
(2) Having custody of any property pursuant to a rental
or lease agreement where it is to be returned in a specified
manner or at a specified time, intentionally fails to comply
with the terms of the agreement concerning return so as
to render such failure a gross deviation from the agreement.
1973
76-6-411.

Repealed.

1974

76-6-412.

Theft — Classification of offenses — Action
for t r e b l e d a m a g e s a g a i n s t r e c e i v e r of s t o l e n
properly.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable:

(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds
$5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable
motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the
time of the theft; or
(iv) proj>erty is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:

